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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW,

Reviewed by Margaret G. Stewart*
A number of years ago, our college collapsed two constitutional
law courses into one. Constitutional Law, a required four-hour course
taught in the third semester,1 replaced a required three-hour course,
Constitutional Law: Powers of Government, and an elective two-hour
course, Constitutional Law: Due Process and Equal Protection.2
While no one argued that there was insufficient material to justify five
hours of coverage, the faculty was concerned that students could and
did graduate without any exposure to the constitutional issues which
are at the heart of popular political discourse and which frequently
dominate the U.S. Supreme Court's3 calendar.
Furthermore, many of us who teach in the area of constitutional
law believed that the division made it more difficult for students to
appreciate the underlying and continual concerns that the roles of
judicial review and federalism present whenever the Court is asked to
justify or reject majoritarian decisions. My search for a text which
emphasized those themes led me to adopt the Stone, Seidman, Sunstein

t Harvey Kalven, Jr., Distinguished Service Professor of Law and Provost, University of
Chicago Law School.
tt Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.
f Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor of Jurisprudence, University of
Chicago Law School and Department of Political Science.
# Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Constitutional Law, Georgetown University Law
Center.
* Professor of Law, lIT Chicago-Kent College of Law; B.A. 1968, Kalamazoo College; J.D.
1971, Northwestern University School of Law.
1. In the evening division, it is taught in the fourth semester.
2. A third elective course on the First Amendment remained unchanged. Since it is not a
course I teach, I have made no comments on the text's treatment of those issues. My focus here
is on Chapters I-VI, which form the core of the four-hour course.
3. Hereinafter referred to as "the Court."

980

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 21:979

and Tushnet casebook.4 Having used it for at least five years, I
remain convinced that it does an excellent job in a difficult field. But,
of course, I have a few quibbles.
It is simply impossible to understand constitutional law without
at least a basic knowledge of the history of the United States. The
longer I teach, the more I realize that assuming student familiarity with
that history is unwise. For every student who can argue the antifederalist position fluently, there is invariably one who has never heard of
the Articles of Confederation. At the same time, as a practical matter,
the amount of current doctrine calling out to be mastered severely
limits the number of classroom hours that can be devoted to the past
political and judicial landscape.
The Stone, Seidman, Sunstein and Tushnet casebook seems to
have found a workable mix. For the most part, it utilizes a chronological approach in its separate treatment of key subject matter areas.
Upon occasion, I have toyed with the idea of trying to teach a History
of Constitutional Law course, focusing, for example, on the Court's
pre-1937 approaches to the scope of congressional power to regulate
under the Commerce Clause and to the simultaneous limits imposed
under the Due Process Clause on the states' authority to regulate
economic activity. However, I always ultimately decide, as did the
authors, that tracing each doctrinal strand results in a more coherent
class. The text itself draws the necessary connections, pointing out the
parallels created by the early 20th century Court's commitment to a
laissez-faire economy in Lochner' and by its restrictive interpretation
of the Commerce Clause.
The authors' general fidelity to this chronological doctrinal
analysis makes their decision to begin a discussion of congressional
power with United States v. Lopez 6 puzzling. Yes, the case presents
a decent (if biased) review of the Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence. Yes, the opinions frame the issue of federalism dramatically.
But students' ability to analyze and criticize the arguments made there,
I think, depends on their understanding of what came before. In just
over forty pages,7 the authors neatly trace the Court's checkered
approach to the Commerce Clause and the Court's apparent abandonment of any attempt to second-guess Congress' determination of what
activity in the aggregate substantially affects interstate commerce. Into

4.

GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (3d ed. 1996).

5. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
6. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
7. STONE ET AL., supra note 4, at 189-233.
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that world Lopez comes as a thunderclap. If for no reason other than
dramatic impact, it belongs at the end of the sequence, not at the
beginning.8
The placement of Lopez is an exception to the authors' usual
chronological approach. The placement of their treatment of fundamental interests in the context of equal protection is an exception to
their doctrinal approach, albeit an exception I think more easily
justified. Chapter V deals with "Equality and the Constitution,"
leading students (again more or less chronologically, though slavery,
school segregation and desegregation are treated separately from other
racial classifications) through the traditional analysis of when and why
legislation that treats persons differently violates the Fourteenth
Amendment. Chapter VI then addresses "Implied Fundamental
Rights," covering, inter alia, economic substantive due process, then
equal protection fundamental interests doctrine, and finally a return to
"modern" (i.e. noneconomic) substantive due process.
While it is true that the Court's attempts to define and justify
"fundamental" interests ordinarily protected from legislative control is
similar in both situations, I find it more logical to complete equal
protection before moving to due process, and more interesting to
compare the Court's economic and noneconomic due process decisions
without a side-trip into equal protection. In the first place, much of
the equal protection fundamental interest material focuses on the right
to vote and increasingly on the appropriate (or inappropriate) use of
race as a gerrymandering tool. The Court's concern here mirrors its
concerns in the more obvious "classification" contexts, particularly in
the realm of affirmative action, and the cases fit well together. In the
second place, the interpretation of economic and modern substantive
due process cases, like the out-of-step treatment of Lopez, lessens the
9
impact of the rejection of Lochner in cases like Roe v. Wade.
Obviously it is possible to remind students of the demise (and of the
rejoicing at the demise) of Lochner, and in notes the text does so. But
the reminder can be made unnecessary.
Quibbles about order are easily overcome; my syllabus just puts
Lopez at the end of the Commerce Clause materials and the equal
protection fundamental rights materials at the end of Chapter V.
Much more important is the continuing reiteration of the themes of

8. Of course, whether the thunderclap heralds a storm or constitutes a squall is debatable.
Certainly most lower courts have not used the case to invalidate other challenged enactments, and
it is impossible to predict what other, if any, confluence of factors would rouse the majority's ire.
9. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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judicial review and federalism I first referred to. Of equal importance
is how the authors attempt to focus student attention on those themes.
The text is characterized by highly-edited opinions and a plethora of
notes that appear to excerpt, to one degree or another, every law review

article and book from every possible point of view on every conceivable
issue. These two characteristics are the book's strength-and its
weakness.
Case Editing. As any constitutional law teacher confronted with
a new Supreme Court opinion in the middle of the term knows, it is
unrealistic to expect students to plow through interminable unedited
pages of argument and counter-argument penned by an increasingly

fractured Court. Most of us find it difficult, if not impossible, to cover
the doctrine as we would wish to; a single one-hundred-page opinion
simply cannot be allowed to consume two hours of class. On the other
hand, teaching constitutional law is not only about teaching constitu-

tional doctrine (or constitutional history). Like all law school teaching,
it is also about teaching legal reasoning and analysis, about helping
students discern what is and what should be used to justify legal
decisions. In its treatment of McCulloch v. Maryland,0 the text
superbly directs attention to precisely those issues. Indeed, it was this
use of McCulloch (rather than the more usual focus on the case as the
seminal interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause) that was
one of the first things that intrigued me. However, highly edited
opinions in effect do this work for the students. The edited version
necessarily separates out the critical from the peripheral, the true issue
from the red herring, the structure from the off-shoots. My classes
love it; and on many days, so do I. It is a practical necessity, and the
authors perform their task well. But I am always grateful for the
occasional opinion that has not been so heavily red-lined, either
because it is itself unusually short or unusually complex, or because it
is in the supplement (where it sometimes seems the number of pages
is less problematic).
Notes. A completely unscientific survey of students over the years
elicited two unanimous comments about the casebook: "It's too
heavy," and "Does anyone read/understand/think about all those
notes?" I suspect the two comments are related. I also suspect, with
some evidence gleaned from class discussion, that the answer to the
second comment is: "only the professor." But it is the notes that
distinguish this casebook, and they are the primary reason I continue
to use it.

10.

17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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Teaching constitutional law is, in my opinion, one of the great
joys of life-and all too often one of life's most frustrating experiences. The subject matter fascinates me, both because of its theoretical
complexity and interdependence and because of its relevance to every
aspect of what it means to be a member of the United States polity at
the end of the twentieth century. I have always been and remain a
deeply political animal; I care very much about the issues the Court
addresses and hold strong opinions about the decisions it reaches. One
challenge is always to make sure that, even though my views inevitably
become known through the course of the semester, positions with
which I disagree get an equal and fair hearing." The eclectic nature
of the notes assures me that none will be inadvertently overlooked.
More important, however, is the role they play in engaging the class.
The first six weeks of the course cover the powers of Congress
and the implications of those powers for notions of federalism (and vice
versa) and the doctrine of separation of powers. With the cutback in
available classroom hours, something had to be dropped from the
original three-hour course I taught, and I happily eliminated most cases
concerning the dormant Commerce Clause. Even I found cases about
curved mud guards12 dull. But I thought that the rest of the cases
would resonate with students. At a time when Newt Gingrich is
calling for a return of control to the states (except, of course, for "tort
reform") and issues concerning the role of special prosecutors dominate
headlines, how can cases defining and limiting federal power or
determining when prosecutorial decision making may be taken away
from the President fail to excite a class? It beats me, but frequently
they do.
The notes help. Some do so by relating the cases to today's
headlines; connections students might not see are drawn for them.
Some do so by virtue of their extreme positions; when what a student
unthinkingly assumes that "everybody knows" is challenged, a defense
becomes necessary and a rethinking may occur. Nonetheless, I fear
most students who come into the class unengaged in structural politics

11. A number of years ago, I had just finished teaching United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S.
683 (1974), when an apologetic student came up and asked if the class had misread me: they all
assumed, he said, that I was a liberal Democrat. True. But then why did I consistently refer to
"President" Nixon and present an argument for the blanket executive privilege the Court denied?
It was one of the best compliments I had ever been paid.
12. Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520 (1959).
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and law remain unengaged, and this suspicion is one of the reasons
teaching constitutional law can be frustrating. 3
The last eight weeks of the course focus on equal protection and
due process. Here the problem is not boredom. Rather, it is an odd
combination of firmly held (though not legally reasoned) convictions
and embarrassment, or at least wariness, of expressing those convictions publicly. One reason I try as hard as I do in the first part of the
semester to foster debate is that the issues are usually less emotional,
and I hope a habit of comfortable participation will develop. The
authors' choice to begin the equal protection material with cases about
slavery and desegregation is also useful here; no one would argue in
favor of slavery or white-mandated segregation of blacks, and so the
discussion can at least begin on common ground.
But once the focus turns to affirmative action, voting districts,
abortion, etc., the silence can be deafening. The notes help, probably
more so here than before. In the first place, more students read more
of them. In the second place, many students find it easier to express
agreement with an "authority" on one side of a debate or another than
to make the same argument unprotected. And in constitutional law,
and in this casebook, it is not difficult to find an "authority" on any
position. Finally, the notes usually effectively challenge the raft of
assumptions students hold based on the extent to which past Supreme
Court decisions have become part of our society's background
knowledge. My favorite example is Reynolds v. Sims, 4 the "one
person-one vote" case. By emphasizing the dissenting opinions in their
edit and by beginning the following notes with a critical quote from
Robert Bork, the authors draw into question why only numbers matter
in apportionment. Most students are stunned to realize that the logic
of the United States Senate stands in opposition. The "I thought I
knew what the answer must be, but now I'm so confused" reaction is
one of the reasons teaching constitutional law is such a joy.
The desire to assure representation of all views is clear in the
choice and number of notes. It is a desire I obviously approve of and
share. However, just as sometimes I wish for less-heavily-edited
opinions, I sometimes also wish for longer excerpts. Trying to do
justice to John Hart Ely, Derrick Bell or Catherine McKinnon in a
paragraph is difficult. But students interested in a particular viewpoint
13. One of the reasons for combining our original two constitutional law courses was that
a significant number of students did not take the Equal Protection and Due Process course.
Anecdotal evidence suggested that many of them had been so bored with the Powers of
Government course that they could not face another two hours of constitutional law.
14. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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are certainly told where to look. As one student said, "... the notes
are good because I intend to keep the book.... I think it will make
an excellent reference book for constitutional law issues in the future."
What more could any teacher--or author-wish for?
While no casebook is without flaws, this one provides a mix of
history, doctrine and commentary that is superb. It is too heavy, but,
unfortunately, whatever changes I would recommend would only
exacerbate the problem. Until the Supreme Court stops deciding cases,
or lawyers stop writing about them, the only solution is a good
backpack. Anything that opens minds as this text does is worth the
weight.

